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The basic premises of the article are not new. In fact, the central argument was put 
forward, in a more sophisticated form, by Michael Tooley in 1972.1 Yet when Alberto 
Giubilini­and­Francesca­Minerva’s­article,­“After-Birth­Abortion:­Why­Should­the­
Baby­Live?”­appeared­online,­it­caused­an­international­uproar.2 The central thesis 
of­the­article­is­that­“after-birth­abortion,”­that­is,­killing­a­baby­after­he­or­she­is­
born,­is­justified­on­the­same­grounds­as­elective­abortions.­The­article­made­many­
defenders of abortion squirm because the conventional view defends abortion but 
prohibits infanticide. The article made critics of abortion squirm because, if accepted, 
it would extend the ethics of exclusion to cover not just prenatal but also postnatal 
human beings.
Giubilini­ and­Minerva­ correctly­ point­ out­ that,­ “the­ same­ arguments­ that­
apply to killing a human fetus can also be consistently applied to killing a newborn 
human.” 3 In other words, these arguments justify killing not just newborns whose 
medical conditions are dire but also elective infanticide when raising a child would 
burden­the­parents.­As­they­say,­“when­circumstances­occur­after birth such that 
they­would­have­ justified­ abortion,­what­we­ call­after-birth abortion should be 
permissible.” 4 So, killing newborn human beings is permissible whenever abortion 
would­be­permissible.­And­what­makes­abortion­and­post-birth­abortion­permissible?
Giubilini and Minerva give two reasons to support their claim that post-birth 
abortion­is­ethically­permissible:­“[1]­The­moral­status­of­an­infant­is­equivalent­
to­that­of­a­fetus,­that­is,­neither­can­be­considered­a­‘person’­in­a­morally­relevant­
1 Michael­Tooley,­ “Abortion­ and­ Infanticide,”­Philosophy and Public Affairs 2.1 
(Autumn­1972):­37–65.
2 Alberto­Giubilini­and­Francesca­Minerva,­“After-Birth­Abortion:­Why­Should­the­
Baby­Live?”­Journal of Medical Ethics, published online (February 23, 2012). 
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., original emphases.
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sense.­[2]­It­is­not­possible­to­damage­a­newborn­by­preventing­her­from­developing­
the potentiality to become a person in the morally relevant sense.” 5­The­first­part­of­
the­first­claim,­the­equal­basic­moral­status­of­infant­and­prenatal­human­being,­is­
accepted­by­pro-life­philosophers,­indeed­it­is­sometimes­used­as­a­basis­for­criticiz-
ing abortion.6 If infanticide kills a being with a right to live, and the moral status 
of a prenatal human being is not fundamentally different from the moral status of 
a postnatal human being, then abortion kills a being with a right to live. Giubilini 
and Minerva turn this reasoning on its head. Beginning from the presupposition 
that abortion is ethically permissible, if newborns have no greater moral status than 
the human fetus, it follows that infanticide is ethically permissible. So at issue for 
defenders­of­human­life­is­the­second­part­of­claim­one,­“neither­[the­newborn­nor­
the­human­fetus]­can­be­considered­a­‘person’­in­a­morally­relevant­sense.”­
What­justifies­the­denial­of­personhood­to­both­newborn­babies­and­prenatal­
human­beings?­They­write,­“Both­a­fetus­and­a­newborn­certainly­are­human­beings­
and­potential­persons,­but­neither­is­a­‘person’­in­the­sense­of­‘subject­of­a­moral­
right­to­life.’ ”­7 This view echoes many authors before them who draw a distinc-
tion between human beings (a biological category) and persons (a moral category) 
i.e., those enjoying basic moral immunities from harm. So, why not hold that all 
human­beings­are­persons?­They­write:­“Merely­being­human­is­not­in­itself­a­reason­
for ascribing someone a right to life. Indeed, many humans are not considered subjects 
of­a­right­to­life:­spare­embryos­where­research­on­embryo­stem­cells­is­permitted,­
fetuses where abortion is permitted, criminals where capital punishment is legal.” 8 
Obviously, however, some human beings enjoy a right to live. What then grants 
these­human­beings­a­ right­ to­ life­on­ the­view­of­Giubilini­and­Minerva?­What­
makes­you­into­a­person?­They­write,­“We­take­‘person’­to­mean­an­individual­who­
is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that 
being deprived of this existence represents a loss to her.” 9 Although the prenate and 
neonate are potential persons—by virtue of their biological constitution ordering 
them toward human maturity—they are not yet actual persons until they can value 
their own existence. 
Now the question becomes why is it necessary for personhood for a being to 
be able to attribute to her own existence some basic value so that deprivation of this 
existence­represents­a­loss­to­her?­For­Giubilini­and­Minerva,­the­answer­to­this­
question is that neither the prenatal human being nor the newborn human being 
can­be­harmed­or­helped,­because­“in­order­for­a­harm­to­occur,­it­is­necessary­that­
someone is in the condition of experiencing that harm.” 10 So, since the baby does 
   5 Ibid.
   6 See­ for­ example,­Christopher­Kaczor,­The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, 
Human Life, and the Question of Justice­(New­York/Abingdon,­UK:­Routledge­Annals­of­
Bioethics, 2011), sec. 3.3. 
   7 Giubilini­and­Minerva,­“After-Birth­Abortion.”
   8 Ibid.
   9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
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not value his or her own existence and does not experience getting killed as a harm, 
killing him or her doesn’t harm the baby, and hence it is not wrong to kill a newborn. 
If no one is harmed, then no harm occurred, and nothing wrong is done.
But surely, an objector might argue, your own mother would have harmed 
you­had­she­authorized­your­death­either­before­or­after­your­birth.­Giubilini­and­
Minerva­respond,­“if­you­ask­one­of­us­if­we­would­have­been­harmed,­had­our­
parents­decided­to­kill­us­when­we­were­fetuses­or­newborns,­our­answer­is­‘no’,­
because­they­would­have­harmed­someone­who­does­not­exist­(the­‘us’­whom­you­are­
asking the  question), which means no one. And if no one is harmed, then no harm 
occurred.” 11­In­other­words,­“we”­did­not­exist­prior­to­birth­or­even­after­birth­until­
we became able to value our own existence.
On Giubilini and Minerva’s view, the interests of real people (parents,  family, 
and society) override the interests of potential people (newborns and prenatal human 
beings). Newborns are both costly and burdensome for parents, families, and  society. 
They­say,­“Actual­people’s­well-being­could­be­threatened­by­the­new­(even­if­healthy)­
child requiring energy, money, and care which the family might happen to be in 
short supply of. Sometimes this situation can be prevented through an abortion, but 
in some other cases this is not possible.” 12 They claim that killing a newborn or a 
preborn­human­being­is­morally­permissible­and­should­be­legally­permissible:­“In­
these cases, since non-persons have no moral rights to life, there are no reasons for 
banning after-birth abortions.” 13 
Why not place children that are unwanted by biological parents into another 
family­via­adoption?­They­answer­ that­ the­weak­ interests­of­actual­persons­ (the­
 biological parents) always trump the non-existent interests of the potential people. 
So, if the parents are uncomfortable with adoption or fear psychological effects on 
them if they place the child in a family via adoption, then their interest in having 
the child not adopted trumps the interest of the child in living, an interest which 
“amounts­to­zero.”­14 
Giubilini and Minerva’s argument is that if abortion is ethically permissible in 
certain social, economic, or psychological circumstances, then consistency demands 
that post-birth abortion (infanticide) also be accepted. Thus, the same reasons that 
justify abortion of the human being prior to birth also justify killing a newborn after 
birth up to the time when neurologists and psychologists assess that the child values 
his or her own existence. Abortion at an early stage may be better for the woman 
psychologically or physically, but according to the authors, there is nothing morally 
wrong with post-birth abortion, particularly in cases where circumstances change 
and­taking­care­of­a­newborn­becomes­something­the­parents­find­burdensome.­
Giubilini and Minerva decline to say exactly when it begins to be wrong to kill 
a baby, leaving the question to psychologists and neurologists to determine when a 
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
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human being begins to value his or her own existence. Psychologist Philippe Rochat 
expresses the view that human beings become self-aware of their own existence at 
around­two­years­of­age:­“There­is­a­general­consensus­on­a­few­major­landmarks­
in young children’s psychological development such as the manifestation of the 
first­social­smile,­ the­first­ independent­steps,­or­ the­first­words.­All­parents­also­
notice­an­important­change­at­around­2­years­of­age­when­children­manifest­‘‘self-
consciousness,’’ the so-called secondary emotions such as embarrassment or pride 
in­very­specific­situations­such­as­mirror­exposure­or­competitive­games.”­15 Until 
human beings become self-conscious and aware of their own existence, they cannot 
take an interest in their continued existence. So, if this general consensus is correct, 
given Giubilini and Minerva’s account, post-birth abortion is morally permissible 
until the child is around two years old. This is an absurd conclusion.
Where­exactly­does­the­argument­go­wrong?­Not­just­one­but­several­of­the­
premises leading to their conclusion are false. Indeed, Giubilini and Minerva’s 
­argument­rests­on­five­faulty­claims.
The­first­of­which­is­that­not­all­human­beings­have­basic­human­rights­because­
of the permissibility of lethal embryo research, legal abortion, and capital punishment. 
However, it is far from self-evident that lethal embryo research, legal abortion, and 
capital punishment are indeed permissible. Giubilini and Minerva presuppose the 
moral acceptability of practices that are among the most controversial and disputed 
in our society. Then, they argue from the deeply controversial to support the even 
more controversial. 
But even if we presupposed that lethal embryo research, abortion, and capital 
punishment were permissible, it still does not necessarily follow (at least without 
further­justification)­that­these­practices­indicate­a­lack­of­a­right­to­life­for­all­humans.­
For example, one might hold that abortion is permissible but justify it by means of 
arguments, like Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist, which do not deny a fetal right 
to life.16 Likewise, capital punishment does not necessarily imply a denial of the 
right to life of the one condemned, insofar as just punishments do not violate basic 
human rights.17­Some­even­defend­embryo­research­as­compatible­with­recognizing­
an embryonic right to life, or they argue that such research does not really destroy 
a­“human­being”­since­twinning­is­still­possible.18 For the sake of argument, even 
granting that these three controversial practices were permissible (and this is to 
15 Philippe­Rochat,­“Five­Levels­of­Self-Awareness­as­They­Unfold­Early­in­Life,”­
Consciousness and Cognition 12.4­(December­2003):­718.
16 Judith­Jarvis­Thomson,­“A­Defense­of­Abortion,”­in­Intervention and Reflection: 
Basic Issues in Medical Ethics,­5th­ed.,­ed.­Ronald­Munson­(1971;­reprint­Belmont,­CA:­
Wadsworth­Publishing,­1996),­69–80.­For­a­response,­see­chapters­7­and­8­of­Christopher­
Kaczor,­A Defense of Dignity: Creating Life, Destroying Life, and Protecting the Rights of 
Conscience (Notre­Dame,­IN:­University­of­Notre­Dame­Press,­2013).
17 See John Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics­(Washington,­DC:­Georgetown­University­
Press,­1983),­128–130.
18 See­Julian­Savulescu,­“The­Embryonic­Stem­Cell­Lottery­and­the­Cannibalization­
of Human Beings,” Bioethics 16.6­(November­2002):­508–529.­For­the­record,­I­think­this­
defense of embryo research fails. 
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presuppose a lot), it is presupposing even more to hold that they each entail a denial 
of all human beings of the right to live. 
Second, Giubilini and Minerva assume that killing a particular human being is 
wrong (only) because the human being desires, takes an interest in, or values his or 
her continued existence and, thus, his or her not being killed. This is implausible in 
part because suicidal human beings (the deeply depressed, drug addicts, and brain-
washed cult followers) do not desire their continued existence, yet suicidal human 
beings still have a right to live, and it is wrong to kill them.19 In fact, we desire things 
(like continued living) because we (rightly or wrongly) think that such things are 
good. What is relevant in determining whether someone has been wronged is not 
whether they were deprived of something they desired (after all, the heroin addict 
desires his heroin) but whether they were deprived of something good to which they 
were entitled.20 Aside from just punishment, and regardless of subjective states of 
mind, to be deprived of a good is relevant for being wronged. 
Third,­Giubilini­and­Minerva­falsely­assume­that­“harm”­is­possible­only­if­
someone experiences it as a harm. However, as they note, if someone buys the win-
ning lottery ticket, but a thief secretly replaces it with a losing ticket, that person has 
been harmed, even if the person is unaware of the switch. Giubilini and Minerva 
respond,­“However,­in­such­cases­we­are­talking­about­a­person­who­is­at­least­in 
the condition to value the different situation she would have found herself in if she 
had not been harmed.” 21 
Yet,­ counter-examples­ abound­ to­ this­ qualification­of­ their­ initial­ premise.­
The lobotomy of a normal adult may so damage the brain that the man or woman 
does not experience the loss of brainpower as a harm and is not in a condition to 
value the difference, yet undoubtedly such a person has been seriously harmed. If 
Giubilini and Minerva’s view were correct, it would follow that someone rendered 
permanently unconscious has not been harmed, since such a human being is not in 
the condition to value the different situation she would have found herself in if she 
19 Some authors, such as David Boonin, take this objection into account. David Boonin, 
A Defense of Abortion­(Cambridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­2003),­70–79.­But­I­think­
these­responses­fail.­See­Kaczor,­Ethics of Abortion, section 4.1.1.
20 In­the­words­of­Patrick­Lee,­“The­positive­attitude­account­puts­the­cart­before­the­
horse. Conditions are not worthwhile because they are desired; rather, they are desirable 
because they are worthwhile, because they have whatever it takes to make something worth 
being desired. Clearly, some of our desires are bad and some are merely whimsical. Since 
worthless objects are sometimes desired, it follows that being desired cannot be what makes an 
object to be worthwhile. So, prior to being desired, the object of desire must have something 
in it which makes it fitting or suitable to being desired. What makes a thing good does not 
consist in its being the satisfaction of desires or preferences; rather, desires and preferences 
are rational only if they are in line with what is genuinely good. So, a state of affairs should 
be desired or cared for if it is inherently valuable. A condition’s being valuable makes desires 
for­it­reasonable,­not­vice­versa.”­Patrick­Lee,­“Substantial­Identity,­Rational­Nature,­and­
the Right to Life,” in Bioethics with Liberty and Justice: Themes in the Work of Joseph M. 
Boyle,­ed.­Christopher­Tollefsen­(New­York:­Springer,­2010),­25,­original­emphasis.
21 Giubilini­and­Minerva,­“After-Birth­Abortion,”­original­emphasis.
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had not been rendered permanently unconscious. Indeed, their account cannot even 
explain why the (painless and quick) murder of an adult person is wrong. Unless we 
assume murder victims consciously survive their own death (which Giubilini and 
Minerva surely reject), the victim does not experience her own death as a harm, nor 
is the victim in a position to value the state that she would have been in if she had 
not been killed, since she does not experience anything at or after her death. If no 
aspect of the victim survives death, this personal annihilation would seem to make 
murder a greater harm than if some aspect of the victim did survive death. Given 
Giubilini and Minerva’s account, personal annihilation is no harm at all. Yet even 
if we assume the immortality of the soul, it would still be false to say that murder 
victims­experience­death­itself,­insofar­as­“they”­(an­integrated­unity­of­body­and­
soul) no longer exist at death, but only an aspect of what was them, their soul, exists. 
As­Saint­Thomas­Aquinas­noted,­“My­soul­is­not­me.” 22 If the soul is not the human 
being, then the unity of body and soul that constitutes a living human being is not 
consciously aware after death. The wrong of killing a conscious adult cannot be 
explained by the victim  experiencing the harm of death or by the victim being in a 
condition to value after their death what life would have been like had the murder 
not happened. 
Fourth, Giubilini and Minerva falsely assume no one has been wronged if 
no one has been harmed. Many counter-examples to this claim are evident. Failed 
 assassination attempts may harm no one, but the target is wronged  nonetheless. 
 Particular cases of perjury may harm no one, but perjury is morally wrong 
 nonetheless.  Malicious slander of someone’s reputation wrongs the one slandered, 
even­if­no­one­believes­the­slander­and­the­slander­ends­up­benefiting­the­intended­
victim. So even if the preborn or newborn were not harmed, it still might be the case 
that he or she was wronged.
Finally,­Giubilini­and­Minerva­falsely­assume­body–self­dualism.­On­this­view,­
“you”­are­your­aims,­desires,­and­awareness,­and­your­body­(the­human­being­that­
your mother had in her womb) is not you. A human organism—not you—was born, 
and­then­months­later­“you”­began­to­exist.­Giubilini­and­Minerva­write,­“So,­if­you­
ask one of us if we would have been harmed, had our parents decided to kill us when 
we­were­fetuses­or­newborns,­our­answer­is­‘no’,­because­they­would­have­harmed­
someone­who­does­not­exist­(the­‘us’­whom­you­are­asking­the­question),­which­means­
no one. And if no one is harmed, then no harm occurred.” 23 Absurd consequences 
follow­from­this­view:­you­are­not­a­human­being,­you­do­not­have­a­birthday,­and­
you­are­not­made­of­flesh­and­blood.­On­their­view,­your­mother­has­never­kissed­
you (since no one kisses the aims, desires, and awareness that constitutes a person). 
It­is­possible­to­enumerate­other­problems­with­the­body–self­dualism.­First,­an­
episodic­problem­also­arises,­for­if­“you”­are­really­your­thoughts,­dreams,­desires,­
and­ aims,­ then­ “you”­pop­ in­ and­out­ of­ existence­ along­with­your­periodically­
present consciousness. Second, if Giubilini and Minerva were right, then curing 
22 Thomas Aquinas, Super primam epistolam ad Corinthios lectura, chapter 15, 
lesson 2.
23 Giubilini­and­Minerva,­“After-Birth­Abortion.”
noTes & ABsTrAcTs  KAczor
745
 dissociative identity disorder, also known as multiple personality disorder, also 
destroys­­“someone,”­since­it­destroys­one­or­more­sets­of­personalities­with­distinct­
aims,­desires,­and­awareness;­but­this­too­is­absurd.­Finally,­body–self­dualism­cannot­
adequately­explain­simple­statements­such­as­“you­see.”­Such­acts­of­sensing­involve­
“you”­doing­both­bodily­acts­(via­the­eyes)­and­intellectual­acts­(via­the­mind).­But­
if you are not a bodily being, then you do not do bodily acts involving bodily organs 
such­as­eyes.­“You”­cannot­see,­taste,­or­walk.24
In sum, Giubilini and Minerva’s argument for post-birth abortion rests on 
several false premises. Since capital punishment, lethal embryo research, and legal 
abortion are among the most contentious issues in our society, these practices cannot 
be used as a non-controversial way to justify a denial of basic rights to all human 
beings. Nor is killing a human wrong simply because it contradicts that human’s 
desire. Indeed, a human being can be harmed even if that harm is not experienced 
by the victim as harm, nor is it the case that a lack of harm means that no wrong 
was­done.­Finally,­Giubilini­and­Minerva­presuppose­a­false­anthropology,­body–
self dualism, in their defense of killing preborns and newborns. Their article does 
highlight­one­very­important­truth:­“The­moral­status­of­an­infant­is­equivalent­to­
that of a fetus.” 25 However, this truth, combined with other true premises, such as 
the equal basic dignity of every human being, points in the direction of preventing 
rather than fostering the killing of human beings either before birth or after birth.
chrisTopher KAczor
24 For much more, see Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Body–Self Dualism in 
Contemporary Ethics and Politics­(Cambridge:­Cambridge­University­Press,­2008).
25 Giubilini­and­Minerva,­“After-Birth­Abortion.”
